Hardcoding fallback server addresses inside millions of client devices creates a persistent distributed denial-of-service risk.
In 2003, the University of Wisconsin-Madison was inundated with hundreds of thousands of inbound packets per second, totaling hundreds of megabits per second of unsolicited traffic. This was not an intentional botnet attack. Netgear had deployed residential routers with firmware containing an SNTP client that hardcoded the university time server IP address, querying it aggressively and retrying with zero exponential backoff upon failure.
Because residential users rarely update firmware, the misconfigured client behavior persisted for years. The university and Netgear had to collaborate on firmware updates, DNS-based steering, and RFC revisions to enforce backoff algorithms and prevent vendor abuse of public infrastructure.
Always design client-server protocols with jittered exponential backoff and domain-based endpoint discovery rather than immutable IP addresses.
